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ASPECT IN FREE AD.JUHCTS 
Gregory T. Stump 
TI1e Ohio State University 
In recent years, semanticists working within a variety of 
analytic traditions have focused much attention On the so-
called aspects in English--the perfect and the progressive; 
their investigations have turned up a number of very subtle 
insights into the nature of the aspects. Ilere, I shall argue 
that certain components of the moaning of the perfect and the 
progressive that have recently been assumed to be intrinsic to 
their semantics are in fact just conversational implicaturos, 
present only in certain sorts of contexts. My arguments are 
based on evidence from the semantics of free adjuncts--non-
finite predicative phrases which function as adverbial clauses, 
like the expressions underlined in (1) and (2); 
(1) \'lalkine home, .John found a dollar. 
(2) !laving finished her lunch 1 Hary went back to 
work. 
as I shall show, free adjuncts revea1 certain semantic proper-
ties of the perfect and the progressive which for very specific 
reasons fail to stand out in some more usual contexts. TI1is 
paper consists of two essentially independent sections, tl10 
first dealing with the perfect, the second, with the pro-
gressive. 
In his recent monograph on the semantics of the English 
perfect t Robert Mccoard ( 1978) discusses four major analyses 
of the perfect which appear recurrently--though in a variety 
of guises--throughout the literature on this subject. TI1e only 
defensible analysis,! he argues, is what he calls the 'extended 
now' theory. 
Tilis theory is based on a distinction between two sorts of 
time-intervals. At a given time-interval t,2 those intervals 
which precede t and are separntod from t are tenncd past inter-
vals, as in Fig. 1. Those intervals which end at t, on the 
other hand, are called extended nows, as in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 1. i is a past interval relativo to t. 
i t 
~ ,,......,,...._ 
Fig. 2. e is an extended now relative to t. 
t 
l ,~, 
The extended now theory holds that the function of the perfect 
is to locate an event within an extended now, while the func-
tion of the preterit is to locate an event at some past inter-
val. According to this analysis, sentence (3) is true at 
interval t iff sentence (4) is true sometime during an extended 
now relative to t, as in Fig. 3. 
(3) John has seen Hary. 
(4) John sees Mary. 





[e is an extended now relative to t; 
e contains i.] 
The preterit sentence (5), on the other hand, is true at inter-
, val t iff sentence (4) is true at some past interval relative 
to t, as in Fig. 4. 
(5) John saw Mary. 
Fig. 4. (5) is true at t iff (4) is true at i. 
i t 
\,........_A----l ,~\ 
[i is a past interval relative to t.] 
In this theory, the perfect is rightly regarded, not as an 
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aspect, in the strict sense, but as a tense. 3 
The special merit of the extended now theory is that it 
affords a semantic account of which sorts of time adverbs may 
occur with the present perfect and which may not. While some 
time adverbs, such as today, may occur with either the present 
perfect or the preterit, others, such as yesterday, occur only 
with the preterit, and still others, like since noon, only with 
the present perfect, as examples (6)-(8) show. 
(6) John 1 ~:: been } on the train today. 
(7) John ~ *has been 1 on the train yesterday. i was 5 
(8) John f has been 1 on the train since noon. *was S 
Let's make the uncontroversial assumption that timo adverbs 
denote sets of time-intervnls, so that the adverbs in (6)-(8) 
have the denotations spelled out in (9). 
(9) today denotes f i: i is a time-interval begin-
ning and ending within the present day J 
yesterday denotes ~ i: i is a time-interval 
beginning and ending within the day pre-
ceding the present day} 
since noon denotes { i: i is an extended now 
beginning later than noon (on the present 
day)} 
Now recall that we said that a preterit sentence is true at 
interval t iff the corresponding present tense sentence is true 
at some past interval relative to t--call this interval j. For 
the caso of a preterit sentence modified by a time adverb, we 
. now make the additional requirement that j be a member of the 
set denoted by the adverb. In this way, the truth of sentence 
(10) at interval t entails both that sentence (11) is true at 
soma past interval relative to t, and, further, that this inter-
val is in the denotation of the adverb yesterday, as in Fig. 5. 
(10) ,John was on the train yesterday. 
(ll) John is on the train. 
111e case of the perfect is analogous. lfo said that a t>resent 
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Fig. 5. ( 10) is true at t iff (11) is true at i. 
i t 
L. ,.-A-, _r ,~, ~ -v--
tho day preceding the 
present day (relative 
to t) 
[i is a past interval relative to t; i is 
in the denotation of yesterday at t.] 
perfect sentence is true at interval t iff the corresponding 
sentence in tho simple present is true sometime during an 
oxtondo<l now relative to t--let's call this extended now e. 
Ne now add tho requirement that if the perfect sentence :ls 
modified by a time adverb, then e must be a member of tho set 
denoted by the adverb. 'Ihus, the truth of sentence (12) at 
interval t ent.ails that there is an extended now relative to 
t which is in the denotation of the adverb since noon and 
during which sentence (11) is, at some time, true, as in Fig. 6. 
(12) John has been on the train since noon. 
Fig. 6. (12) is true at t iff (11) is true at i. 
noon 
e 
[e is an extended now relative to t; o is in 
the denotation of since noon at t; e con-
tains i.] 
If perfects and preterits are interpreted in this way, 
then the unacceptable sentences (13) and (14) will turn out to 
be contradictions--in both sentences, the tense and the time 
adverb will give rise to conflicting entailments. 
(13) *John was on the train since noon. 
(14) *.John has been on the train yesterday .• 
For (13) to be true at interval t, (11) would have to be true 
at some time-interval that is past relative to t anci that is, 
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additionally, a member of the set denoted by since noon; but 
there can be no such interval, since every member of this set 
is an extended now relative to t. Likewise 0 if (14) were true 
at interval t, then (11) would have to be true sometime during 
an interval that is both an extended now relative to t and a 
member of the set denoted by the adverb yesterday; but this is 
impossiblet since members of the latter set will always be 
separated from t. Note that sentences ( 15) and (16) are, on 
the other hand, both acceptable_ because the denotation of the 
adverb today at interval t contains both past intervals, like i 
in Fig. 7, and extended nows, like e. 
(15) John has been on the train today. 
(16) John was on the train today. 






the present day (relative to t) 
As these few examples suggest, the extended now theory of 
the perfect affords a subtle and intuitive account of how time 
adverbs join with tenses in English.4 
What I shall argue in this section is that, contrary to 
the central claim of tho extended now theory, the real func-
tion of the perfect is to locate an event either within an 
extended noH or within n past intervaL That is, I shall argue 
that the semantics of the perfect is such that sentence (3) is 
true at interval t in either of the situations represented in 
Fig. 8. This claim would appef\I' to be inunecliately contradictod 
by the anomaly of sentences (13) ancl (14); but I shall argue 
that this is a pragmatic anomaly, not a semantic one, as the 
oxtendcd now theory implies. 
Consider sentence (17). 
(17) Having been on the train 0 .John knows. exactly 
why it derailed. 
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Fig. 8. (3) is true at tiff (4) is true at j. 
t 




I 1 > 
[e is an extended now relative to t; i is a 
past interval relative to t; both e and i 
contain j.] 
11\e free adjunct in this sentence is headed by the have of tho 
perfect. TI10 extended now theory predicts that adjuncts of 
this sort will contain time adverbs like since noon, but not 
those like yesterday, which, it is argued, are semantically 
incompatible with the perfect. Yet, as the acceptability of 
both (18) nnd (19) sh0t1s, perfect adjuncts may contain adverbs 
of either sort: 
(18) Having been on the train since noon, John knows 
exactly why it derailed. · 
( 19) Having been on the train yesterday, .John knows 
exactly why it derailed. 
There is, however, an intuitive difference between (18) and 
(19): if we paraphrase those with sentences (20) and (21), 
which have full adverbial clauses instead of free adjuncts, we 
find that while the perfect construction in sentence ( 18) func-
tions essentially like a present perfect, that in ( 19) has the 
ftmction of a preterl t. 
{has been} (20) Decause he l*was on tho train since noon, 
John knows ox11ctly why it derailed. 
{*has boen7 (21) Because he~was Jon the train yesterday, 
John knows exactly why it derailed. 
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The use of the perfect construction in a preterit role is 
in fact very widespread. It shows up in eve-ry nonfinite struc-
ture that admits the perfect; in the structures in (22), for 
example, the underlined phrases can function as present perfects 
or as preterits, depending on tho accompanying adverb. 
(22) Marked in fini ti ve complements: 
nu 1 seems to have.slept f sincte nloon. 
lyes ert ay. 
Unmarked infinitive complements: 
S since noon. Hary may have played the pi mo l yesterday. 
Adverbial infinitives: 
To have done the entire j b ~ since noon 2 
~~~~~~~~~~~&~0- l yesterday S ' 
John must have had help. 
Gerunds: 
In spite of having studied {since noon? l yesterday j 6 
.Tohn isn 1t confident of passing. 
(since noon 2 
His having been in Nol'/ York l yesterday 5 is 
hard to explain. 
Participial absolutes: 
His father having driven ~ since noon i , .John l yesterday S 
wants to tnlce the wheel. 
'Reduced relative clauses': 
J\nyone having spoken with Anne (since noon~ l yesterday j 
should contact the police. 
Furthermore, the perfect constxuction may serve as a preterit 
in the past and future perfects. Those compo1ind tenses are 
nonnally analyzed as the preterit or futu:ro of n present per-
fect; and this analysis would appear to be correct in the case 
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of sentences liko (23) nnd (24). 
(23) John had worked on the problom since·noon. 
(24) John will have worked on the problem since noon. 
nut tho acceptability of sentences like (25) and (26) compels 
us to admit thnt the past and future perfect constructions may 
express the pro tori t or future of a prcteri t ;S otherwise, sen-
tencf}s (25) nnd (26) would be fully as anomalous as (27). 
(25) John had worked on tho problem the day before. 
(26) .John will have worked on the problem the day 
before. 
(27) *Jolm has worked on the problem yesterday. 
It appears, then, that the perfect construction can asswne 
a preterit function in any nonfinite structure in which it may 
appear, as woll as in the preterit and future tenses--in other 
words, everywhere but in the present tense. nut it is just the 
present perfect that is actually in competition with the pro-
terit--there is nothing comparable to the preterit with which 
the perfect may contrast in nonfini te constructions or in the 
preterit or future tenses. Titis is a critical fact in tho 
analysis which I now propose for the perfect. 
In my analysis, the preterit tense is assumed to locate 
an evont at some past intervnl--oxactly as in the extended now 
theory; tho perfect, however, receives a. much broader inter-
pretation: n perfect sentence is truo at interval t iff the 
corresponding simple prosont tense sentence is true sanetime 
during an interval j which lasts no Inter than t; if the per-
fect sentence is modified by a time adverb, then j must be n 
member of its denotation. Because j may be a past interval 
or an extended now, my analysis predicts that perfocts will 
occur acceptably both with adverbs like since noon and with 
those like yosterdny; this prediction is borne out in the V:lst 
majority of cases, as we have seen--everywhere but in the pre-
sent tense. Tite present perfect is distinguished because it 
directly competes with the preterit; this, I claim, is the 
source of the unacceptability of sentences like (14). 
In his article 'Conversational Implicature and the Lexi-
con', HcCnwley (1978) argues that 'what is conversationally 
implicated by an utterance depends not only on the utterance 
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but on Nhat other utterances the speaker could have pro<luced 
but did not 1 (p. 245); he discusses several cases a in which an 
utterance conversationally implicates something by virtue of 
its "taking more effort" or "taking the spea1rnr further out of 
his way" than some alternative utterance. 16 1110 case of the 
present perfect is analogous to the exrunples discussed by 
lfcCawley. 
When we use a present perfect sentence like (3), we con-
versationally implicate that we had a reason for not using the 
corresponding preterit (5), namely that John °s seeing Mary 
happened during some extended now which we find especially 
salient. 
(3) John has seen Mary. 
(5) .John snw !lary. 
·n1is implicature in effect eliminates the overlap between the 
truthcondi tions of the perfect and those of the preterit, so 
that, for pragmatic reasons• the present perfect seems to have 
exactly the truthcondi tions ascribed to it by the extended nO\'/ 
theory. Thus, sentence (28) is, in my analysis, pragmatically 
rather than semantically anomalous: the adverb yesterday 
unequivocally locates the event of John's seeing rlary at a past 
interval, so that there would normally be no motive for choosing 
the perfect over the preterit in this sentence (but soo foot-
note 7). 
(23) *.Jolm has seen Mary yesterday. 
This analy!iis implie5 that the perfect is somehow more 'marked' 
or 1 takes the speaker further cut of his way' than the preterit. 
1his seems to bo true, whether one considers syntactic or seman-
tic evidence. 1i1e perfect, a periphrastic rather than meroly 
inflectional tense, is structurally more complex than the pre-
terit. And semantically, the job of the perfect is to locate 
an event some\'1:1ore within a given interval, while the preterit 
just locates nn event at some inte17a1. 11\e perfect i5 clearly 
the 'marked case' in both respects. 
In the extended now theory, the perfect is simply equated 
with tho present perfect; yet, as we have seen, it is precisely 
the present perfect that, for pragmatic reasons, provides the 
least insight into tho true nature of the perfect. As a con-
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sequgnce, the extended now theory provides no account whatso-
ever of the use of the perfect in a pretedt rolo in nonpre-
sont tense constructions. Hy analysis, on the other hand, 
allm'/s all porfocts to be uniformly interpreted, whether they 
are present, past, future, or nonfinite; furthennore, it recog-
nizes tho prngmaticnlly exr.eptional naturo of the present per-
fect. These are its principal advantages. 
I now turn to an analogous :irgwnont regarding the semantics 
of the progressive. 
It has recently been argued that an adequate truthcondi-
tional account of tho progressive must incorporate bo.th tem-
poral and morlal conditions. 
n1e temporal dimonsion of the truth conditions has been 
assumed for several years now. In unpublished work dating from 
1972, Hichael Dennett and Oarbnra Partee argued that a progres-
sive sentence is true at interval t9 iff the corresponding non.;. 
progressive sentence is true at some interval of time properly 
containing t (but not ending with t) ; according to their truth-
condi tions, sentence (29) is true at some interval iff sentence 
(30) is true at some more encompassing interval, as in Fig. 9. 
(29) John is pushing a cart. 
(30) John pushes a cart. 




[i properly contains t; t doesn't contain t'.] 
David Dowty (1979: Ch.3) has recently argued that this 
temporal condition is by itself inader:.uate, owing to what he 
calls the 'imperfective paradox'. The parndox consists in the 
fact that progressives with accomplishment or achievement 
predicates, like those in b31), do not entai 1 the corresponding 
nonprogressive sentences; 1 for example, the truth of sentence 
(32) would not allo~t one to infer the truth of (33)-- (32) could 




paint a picture . 
melt an icecube 
recite a poem 
walk to K. C. 
rend oneself to sleep 
(Cf. Ven<llcr (1967); 
Achieve1:1cnt 
predicates 
notice a picture 
melt 
rcmembel" a poem 
reach K. c. 
fall asleep 
Dowty (1979: Ch.2 ,3)) 
(32) 'Ille glass was falling to the floor. 
(33) '1110 glass fell to the floor. 
The consequence of this paradox is that we cannot regard the 
progressive simply as a temporal operator, according to which 
the actual truth of a progressive sentenco at somo interval 
depends upon the actual truth of the corresponding nonprocres-
sive sentence at some surrounding time-interval. Instead, we 
must acknowledge a modal dimension in the truthconditions for 
the progressive. Consider sentence (34). 
(34) The glass is falling to the floor. 
(35) TI1e glass falls to the floor. 
Intuitively, the truth of this sentence at some interval t 
implies that sentence {35) would be truo at some interval 
properly containing t if notlting unanticipated ware to impede 
the glass' fall subsequently to t--that is, if the 'natural. 
course of events 1 were somehow allowed to flow inertly starting 
at t. · 
Dowty (1979: 145-150) proposes truthcondi tions for the 
progressivo which embody this intuition modol-theoretically. 
Crucial to these truthcon<li til'ns is n category of possible 
worlds which he calls inertia uorlds. Given nny interval of 
time i, a set of inertia worlds is assigned to i; this set is 
to be thought of as containing exactly those worlds that aro 
like the real world up to and including i, and 'in which the 
future course of events after this time develops in war most 
compatible with the past course of oven ts' (1979: 143). 1 
r:mploying this novel addition to model structure, Dowty offers 
truthconditions for the progressive which may ho paraphrased 
as in (36). 
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(36) A sentence p in the progressive is true at 
interval t i ff there is some interval i which 
properly contains t (but which doesn't end with 
t) such that the nonprogressi ve sentence corres-
ponding to p is true nt i in every member of 
the set of inertia worlds assigned to t. 
(Cf. Dowt)' (1979:149)) 
Acc~ruing to (36), sentence (34) is true at interval tiff (35) 
is true at some more encompassing interval in every inertia 
world assi.gnocl to t, as in Pig. 10. 
Fig. 10. (34) is true 
(35) is true 






actual world) iff 






[i properly contains t; t doesn't contain t'.] 
As you can seo, this account of the progressive captures both 
it:; temporal and modal dimensions. 
In this section, I shall argue that the progressive aspect 
in fact has no independent semantic status in English--that its 
truthconditions are entirely determined by general semantic pro-
perties of present participles and conversational implicatures. 
A good constzuction to examine in order to £ind out about 
the semantics of present participles is the free adjunct con-
struction: not only can the full range of present partidpial 
phrases occur as free adjuncts, 12 but other sorts of predicative 
phrases can as well; this allows us to detexmine exactly which 
parts of the meaning of a present participial adjunct derive 
from the participial phrase its elf, and which are part of the 
constructional meaning of free adjuncts generally. Furthennore, 
it's clear that present participial adjuncts are not just. 
degenerate progressives, since those stative predicatesl3 which 
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fail to occur in the progressive nevertheles~ do show up in 
adjuncts of this sort, as the eXa.m:>les in (37) show. 
(37) llcing a sailor, John smokes a pipe. 
(Cf. *.Tohn is being a sailor.) 
!laving barely enough money for bus faro, Hnry 
decided to skip lunch. 
(Cf. *Mary was having barely enough money for 
bus fare.) 
Weighing five tons, our truck made the bridge 
shake. 
(Cf. *Our truck was weighing five tons.) 
One conclusion which can be drawn on tho evidence of froe 
adjuncts is that imperfectiveness is not a property peculiar to 
the progressive. It doesn ° t necessarily follow from sentence 
(38) that John actually crossed the street, any mora than it 
follows from sentence (39); (38) ~ like (39), may be felt to 
imply only that .John would have crossed tho street if nothing 
unanticipated had happened. 
(38) Crl)ssing the street, .John was hit by a car. 
(39) .John was crossing tho street. 
It's important to recognize that the imperfectiveness of tho 
adjunct in (33) is a consequence of the fact that the adjunct 
consists of a present pnrticipiAl phrase. Free adjuncts of 
other kinds-- those consisting of past participial phrases, 
adjective phrases, prepositional phrases, or predicative noun 
phrases--are never imperfective in this way, H as the examples 
in (40)-(43) suggest. 
('10) neaten, the team left tne field. 
(41) ~fary, asleep, didn't hear the noise. 
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( 42) In his new outfit, Bill lookod ton years younger. 
(43) A dedicated boy scout, John showed us overy 
knot in the book. 
Present participial phrases, hcwever, show this property in 
other sorts of constructions, including those excmpli fled in 
(44). 
:~otice, however, that although progressive sentences wit!1 
accomplishment or achievement predicates are alwnys felt to be 
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(44) Adnominal participles: 
r.tary found the 1ying man. 
[ cloesn' t entail that he diedJ 
TI1e man crossin~ the street was hit by a car. 
[doesn't entail that he crossed the street] 
'Temporally restrictive pnrticiples•: 15 
John sat reciting the Ilia<l. 
[doesn't on tail that he reel ted tho Iliad] 
Jane found Rover nmnin~ across a fiel<l. 
[docsn 1t entail that e ran across the field] 
Augmented a<ljuncts:16 
While copying the sentence into his notebook• 
he ran out of ink. 
[doesn't entail that he copied the sentence 
into his notebook] 
imperfective, prosent participial adjuncts with such predicates 
are open to perfective as well as imperfective interpretations. 
For ex:ll!lple, al though we can never infer sentence (45) from 
sentence (39), we might well infer ( 45) from ( 46); 
(45) John crossed the street. 
(46) Crossing the street, John entered the building 
opposi to his office. 
we might even draw this inference from sentence (38), if we 
made the rather unlikely assumption that the car that hit ~Tohn 
was driving down the sidewalk on the opposite side of the 
street. Present participles in other constructions also seem 
to admit both perfective and imperfective interpretations: sen-
tence (47), for instance, can be taken as either (43) or (49), 
nnd sentence (SO), as either (51) or (52). 17 
(47) In the fourth inning, John bet on the winning 
team. 
(48) In the fourth inning, .John bet on the team that 
was winning. 
(49) In the fourth inning, .John bet on the team that 
won. 
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(50) Hveryone climbing the mountain received a prize. 
(51) Everyone who was climbing tho mountain received 
a prize. · 
(52) Everyone who climbed tho mountain received n 
prize. 
Thus, while progressives appear nlways to be imperfective, 
. present participial phrases in other sorts of constructions may 
or may not be. One way to account for this asymmetry is to 
postulate two sorts of present participial phrases in English--
one perfective, the other imperfective-- and to assume that both 
kinJs may occur as froe adjuncts or aclnominal modifiers but that 
only tho imperfective sort may occur as progressives. Titis 
solution would account for the facts, but only by sheer bruto 
force. 
I wish to propose a more interesting explan:ition, according 
to \·1hich present participial phrases are unifonnly interpreted 
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and the observed asymmetry fol lows from conversational principles. 
In my analysis, present participial phrases are semantically 
indeterminate as to their perfectiveness; any resolution of this 
indetenninacy is takon to be the result of the inforonces of 
language users. 
Let's suppose that sim?le verb phrases denote sets. so 
that, for example, tho denotation of the verb phrase cross the 
stroet at some interval is exactly the set of individuals who 
Cr'Os"'Sthe street at that intorval. 1hen we can interpret a 
present participial phrase in tenns of the corresponding verb 
phrase a~ in (53): 
(53) /Ul individual x is in the denotation of a 
present participinl p~trase P at interval t 
iff thero is some interval i which con tnins t 
[N.n.: possibly identical with t] and at which 
x is in the denotation of the simple verb 
phrase corresponding to P in every rnember of 
tho set of inertia worlds assigned to t. 
Ai:cording to (53), John is in the denotation of the present 
participial phrase crossing the street at interval t iff there 
is some interval i at which sentence (54) is true in ever/ 
inertia worlJ assigned to t, as in Fig. ll. Now, (53) allows 
i either to properly contain t or to be identical with t: 
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(54) John crosses the street. 
Fig. 11. .John is in the denohtion of crossing the 
street at t iff (54) is true at i in each 
of w0 , ••• , wn. 
inertia worlds • 
assigned to t • 
w 
tho sot of { w0 
n ~~~+-~~~~~~~--.~-f-
actual world 




when i properly contains t, tho participial phrase will be 
understood imperfectively; but if i is identical with t, then 
tho particlpial phrase will be perfective, since, as you will 
recall, the inertia worlds assigned to t are identical to the 
actunl Norld at all times up to and including t. Thus, from 
a strictly semantic point of view, sentence (55) is not ambi-
guous between an interpretation in which .John runs into r.lary 
after crossing tho street and one in which ho encounters her 
while he's crossing it--rather, it's in<letenninate between the 
two re aclin gs. 
(55) Crossi.ng tho street, John runs into nary. 
Of course, the question of whether or not nn event is 
completed is bound to be a very salient one in most conver-
sational contexts. Accordingly, we might wel 1 infer that 
someone uttering sentence (55) intends the free adjunct to be 
construed as either perfective or imperfective; in some cases 
--sentences (38) and (46), for instance--it 1 s almost impossible 
not to draw such an inference. 1110 effect of these inferences 
is, as it were, to sharpen the rehltion between i and t in (53) 
to one of proper containment or one of identity.13 
In my nnalys is, the progressive is simply a pre di ca ti ve 
constniction, consisting of a semantically empty copula and a 
present participial phrase, interpreted exactly as in (53). 
ilut recall that, unlike other present participial constructions, 
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the progressive aclmi ts only imperfccti vo intorprctntions with 
accomplishment and nchievement predicates. 111is D I claim, is 
a simple consequence of the fact t!1at tho progressive ten~es 
are in direct competition with t:10 simple tenses. '.~hen we 
use a past progressive sentence like (32)p we conversationally 
implicate that Ne have some rea~on for avoiding the correspon-
ding preterit (33), which is both structurally and conceptually 
simpler than (32). If its participial phrase :l.s construoJ per-
fectively, (32) is prngmatically equivalent to (33); accor-
dingly, the use of (32) illl'..:>licates that its participial phrase 
is to be tmdorstood imporfoctivcly. 
(32) 'IOe gla~s was falling to the floor. 
(33) 'Ifie glass fell to the floor. 
Another difference between progressives and other sorts of 
present participial constructions can also bo re~nr<led as n 
consequence of tho competition between the progressive tenses 
and t!1e simple tenses. Recall that most stative predicates do 
not occur in the progressive, though they may occur as present 
participial }Jhrasos in free adjuncts, adnominal modifiers, and 
augmented adjuncts, as the examples in (56) and (57) suggest. 
(56) *lie is owning a Porsche. 
*lie is weighing only 150 lbs. 
(5 7) 0\-ming a Porsche, .John often tnkes short trips 
on the week end. 
Weighing only 150 lhs., Dill didn't make the 
team. 
/\nyone owning a Porsche should he happy. 
A man weighing only 150 lbs. defeated the chnmr. 
111ough own inc a Porsche, he doesn't enjoy 
Jriving much. 
T:1ough wcighina only 150 lbs., he is quite 
strong. 
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Dowty (1979: Ch.3) has shown thnt those stativos that fail to 
occur in the progressive have a distinguishing semantic property: 
if they apply to an in<livi<lual nt !-lomc intorv~1 of til'!le, then 
they apply to thnt individual at every moment throughout that 
interval. Ti1is means that a progressive sentence with a predi-
cate of this sort would always be pragmatically equivalent to 
the corresponding nonprogressive sentence. Thus, at least one 
of the reasons for tile failure of these stati vcs to occur in 
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t:ie progressive appears to be based on conversational principles 
of the sort discussed by r1cr.awley: we would never have any 
reason for choosing n progressive tense over the corresponding 
simple tense in a sentence with one of these st a ti ves as its 
pre<lic:tte.19 llut because there is not:1ing comparable to the 
simple tenses with Nhich present participial phrases may com-
pete in tho constructions exor.1plifiod in (57), tho use of 
present participial statives poses no conversational anomalies 
in these constructions. 
Drawing on the evidence of free adjuncts, I have presented 
two arguments regarding tho semantic analysis of tho so ... called 
aspects in English. First, I have argued that the function of 
the perfect is to locate an event within a past interval or an 
extended now, and that the fact that the present perfect seems 
to place events only within extended nows can be explained in 
tenns of conversational principles. Second, I have argued that 
the pro3resslve is not a special semnntic category of English, 
but that its truthcondi tions deri vo from those common to all 
present participial phrases; tho fact that the progrossi ve, 
unlike other sorts of present participial constructions, can 
only be understood ir.tperfcctively in the presence of an accomp-
lishment or nchicveracnt predicate is shown, again, to follow 
from conversational principles. 
N01TIS 
1After reviewing n considerable body of evidence, McConrd 
concludes thnt the other three are inadequate ei thcr because 
they r:1istakcnly equate the meaning of the perfect with some 
pragmatic implication associated Ni th the perfect in certain 
cont~xts, or because they depend on an erroneous identification 
of the perfect with a complex configuration of simple tenses. 
2see Dowty (1979: 138) for arguments in favor of interpre-
ting expressions with respect to intervals of time rather than 
moments. Hor.tents, of course, can be regarded as one sort of 
interval. 
3see HcCoard (1978: Ch. 1) for argument~ to this effect. 
4For a much more detalled account along these lines, see 
STUMP 
Dowty (1979 :339ff). 
SucCm·lloy (1971) has pointed this out. 11cCoard (1978: 152) 
acknowledges that 0 the opposition [of the porfoct] with the 
preterit exists only in tensed forms' and seems (p.17~) to 
accept the notion that 1 some embedded non tensed perfects are 
actually derived frora preterits'. lie appears not to have 
noticed that the perfoct can serve as a preterit in the 
past nnd future perfect constructions, though he cites (p .184) 
one of r.tcCawley's examples which shows this. 
6For example, he points out that though we can say some-
thing is pale green, pale blue, or pale yellow, H's odd to say 
that something is pale red, owing to the nvai. labi 1i ty of the 
adjective pink; consequently, when we do say that som(}thing 
is pale red, we conversationally implicnte that pink for sorao 
reason does not apply--that we 're talking about some color 
intennediate between red and pink• even though this may be 
much less pale than colors like pale green or pale blue. 
7rt might be objoctod that the unacceptability of (28) is 
simply too blatant to he pragmatic. nut as li tt lo ns we know 
about prag;natics, it would be foolish to preju<lico our research 
with the assumption that pragmatic vnomalies nre inh~rently 
hazy. Furthermore, seritence (28) is acceptable in some con-
texts, as, for example# in (i): 
(i) So far, .Jo!ln has seen Mary yestor<lay, DUI has 
seen hor this morning, 
lie re, the perfect is accompanied by two adverbs--yester<lay an<l 
so far. So far, like since noon, denotes a set of extended 
nows; for"tl\I'S"reason, 1 t licenses the appearance of the per-
fect in this sontonce. (Note that sentences lik<' (i) are 
nevertheless explicit contradictions in the extended now 
theory.) 
Perfect sentences involving two (or more) adverbs require 
slightly moro complicate,1 truthcon<li tions than are assumed in 
tho text: a perfect sentence p Modi fietl by a set s of adverbs 
is true at t iff the simple pTesent tense sentence correspon-
ding to p is true at some interval i such that the denotation 
of every member of s has a member which contains i and 11hic!1 
las ts no lntor than t. 
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l\JnJer the extended now theory, the perfect would appa-
rently have to have two distinct sots of truthconditions, one 
for present perfects, tho other for other sorts of perfects. 
This would not only ho inologm1t; it would in fnct be incompati-
ble with certain versions of. the princlple of compositional 
interpretation, 
9 J\ctun lly, they re la ti vize the interpTotation of ,ror,res-
si vo sontencos to moments r:ithor than intervals. Seo Dot·1ty 
(1979: 138, fnit) for nn argument that progressives should be 
interpreted relative to intervals whose length is possibly 
greater than a moment. 
10Progressivc sentences with activity predicates ("lalk, 
~. listen for something) pragmatically entai 1 tho corros-
ponuing simple present tense sentence. Soe Dowty (1979: Ch.3). 
llone might object to Dowty's analysis on tho grounds 
that in some (maybe even most) situations it is very hard to 
decide what tho natural course of oven ts would be, nut Dowty 
himself remarks (1979: 149) that 'while there are sovoroly sub-
jocti vo differences among individuals 1 beliefs as to how. the 
world woul<l "turn out" if left uninterforod with, agreement 
on tho truth of progressive sentences, to the extent that such 
agreement obtains at all, presupposes that such beliefs aro 
held in common, 1 'Natural course of events' may be a vague 
notion, but the role it plays in the interpretation of imper-
fective progressives is quite clear. 
Note that Oowty relativizos the interpretation of progres-
sives to sets of inertia worlds. 111is is merult to capture the 
intuition that there may be sevaral mutually exclusive natural 
courses of cvents--for example, at least two natural courses of 
oven ts mny ensue when a coin is flipped. ~~otice, however, that 
his truthconditions require that the simple present tense sen-
tence corresponding to a progressive be true in every member of 
the relevant set of inertia worlds; see Dowty (1979: 147f) for 
justification. 
12A broader range of pTosont participial phrnses may 
appenr as free adjuncts than may appenr as 'reduced relative 
clauses' or temporally restrictive :tdjectives: 
Being an experienced cook, John knows all about wine. 
STUMP 
*Anyone being an experienced cook should know all 
about wine. 
*I saw him being an experienced cook. 
13These are what Dowty (1979: 184) terms momentary predi-
cates. 
14 As I have sho1m elsewhere (Stump ( 1930. forthcoming)) , 
the logical role that a free adjunct plays in a sentence ls 
by and large determined by inference: the absence of any 
explicit subordinating conjunction in sentences like (i) and 
(ii) forces us to fill in the relation joining the adjunct 
to its superordinate clause; this may ho a relation of 'causa-
tion', as in (i), one of concession, as in (ii)--all sorts of 
relations are possible. 
(i) Being a sailor, .John knows all about boats. 
(ii) Secretly preferring to go dancing• tfary gave 
in and went skydiving. 
This being so, it would on the face of it seem qui to reasonable 
to suppose that the felt imperfectiveness of the adjunct in (38) 
is in fact just a consequence of the sort of relation that is 
inferred to _join it with its superordinate clause. 
Despite the superficial appeal of this explanation, we 
r.iust reject it. If users' inferences were rcspons:i.ble for 
the possibility of understanding the adjunct in sentence (iii) 
imperfectivel)•, they Noul<l, in the srur.e way, admit an imper-
fect! ve interpretation for the adjunct in (iv); hut such an 
interpretation is not found. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Losing, the Phillies left the field. 
neaten, the Phillies left the fielcl. 
15nowty (1973) discusses adjectives of this sort. 
16111ese are adverbs consisting of a subordinating conjunc-
tion nnd a predicative phrase (usually pnrtidpial, adjectival, 
or preposition). Sec Stu111p (forthcoming: Ch. l). 
17 I do not wish to st•.ggcs t that ( 48) , ( 49) , (51), and (52) 
represent the only possible rea<lings for (47) and (SO); other 
interpretations are clearly possible. 
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O<lclly, temporally restr:l.ctive participles like those in 
(4•1) seem to resist a perfective interpretation. I suspect 
that this is the reflection of a semantic peculiarity common 
to all temporally restrictive a<ljoctives. My hnJOthesis is 
that tite truth of sentences like the thirJ and fourth in ( 44) 
at some interval i cntai ls that the un<lerlined pre<licates are 
true of t:te referents of their 'controllers' at every moment 
throur,hout i. Since predicates that mny appear in the progres-
sive generally do not express properties that an individual 
might have at a single moment, this entailment of tho tempo-
rally restrictive adjective constrnction woul<l have tho effect 
of forcini! an imperfective interpretation for tenpornlly 
restrictive participles. 
181 t might he objected that the difference between the 
perfective and the imperfective construal of n present parti-
cipial phrase is a genuine ambiguity according to certain 
fruailinr tests; for exnople, in 
.Tohn will give a prize to everyone climbing this moun-
tain, and so will .Jane, 
it is virtually impossible to get a reading that is 'crossed' 
with respect to the perfecti voness of tho a<lnominal participle 
(cf. Lnkoff (1970)). nut identity tests of this sort aren't 
a sufficient indicator of ambiguity. On the contrary, there 
arc several semantically indeterminate constructions in which 
nn in fcrred resolution of the incletenninacy rem:iins constant 
under a..·rnphora. For example, among the logical roles that can 
he inforro<I for the free adjunct in (i) nre those of the adver-
hinl clauses in (ii) and (iii) (in both cases, the participle 
is construed perfectively). 
(i) Driving home, ,John listcnecl to the news on his 
car radio. 
(ii) After he drove home, .Tohn listened to the news 
on his car radio. 
(iii) i'lhilc he drove home, John listened to the 
news on his cnr radio. 
(i) is indeterminate between these (nnd other) readings; yet, 
they don't 'cross' under anaphora--if ue Wtderstand (iv) to 
imply that what :tary claims is (ii), then it implies that .Jane 
makes the same claim. For further <liscussion, see Stump (forth-
co:ning) • 
STUMP 
(iv) Mary claims that driving home, John listened 
to tho news on hls car radio, and so does 
Jane. 
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19111erc nre probably other reasons for the failure of most 
stative predicates to occur in the progressive--sec Dowty {1979: 
173 ff). ilevertheless, see Taylor (1977:206) for an exr>lllnation 
based on conversational principles that is very much like that 
assumed hero. 
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